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Introduction
This article considers the challenge that an English legal history of
the category monster poses for Foucault’s genealogy of the abnor-
mal individual. While the idea of the monster is not confined to law
it is contended that the inauguration of the monster category into
English law and its subsequent development provides a useful
vantage point from which to critique Foucault’s position. While law
is only one discourse among others it is a discourse that possesses
an authority few others do. A study of the monster as legal cat-
egory1 promises to offer important insights for thinking about
questions of difference and exclusion in contemporary life. Michel
Foucault has intimated that the idea of the monster operates as a
kind of master category for understanding contemporary forms of
exclusion, erasure, surveillance and control. Certainly, he under-
stands the idea of abnormality as structured by this much older
legal category.2
The genealogy of the abnormal individual offered by Foucault,
one linking human monsters of old to abnormal individuals of the
present, is an important piece of historical scholarship. A study of
the legal category monster within English law provides evidence in
support of many of Foucault’s historical and theoretical claims
concerning monsters. In particular, it provides support for the
theoretical framework in which Foucault locates an understanding
of monsters. However, an English legal history of the monster
category suggests a number of important caveats. The article will
first consider the idea of the monster in conceptual terms, focusing
in particular on understandings of the monster offered by Canguil-
hem and Foucault. It will then address Foucault’s historical
treatment of monsters and correspondingly, his genealogy of the
abnormal individual. Finally, a legal history of the monster category
will be sketched and compared with Foucault’s historical account.
A Conceptual Framework
There is a great deal of literature on the subject of monsters.3 It
would seem that each culture and all historical periods breed
monsters. The monster is, as Cohen suggests, “pure culture.”4 That
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is, the monster is a cultural construction, either completely ficti-
tious or a designation made in relation to living flesh. Moreover, it
would seem that it is living flesh, rather than non-organic types of
monster, which arouses the greatest anxiety. Indeed, for Canguil-
hem “[t]he qualification of monster must be reserved for organic
beings.”5 The term monster is another name for hybridity or
“otherness within sameness,”6 and typically refers to a creature
that is both, and simultaneously, human and non-human. The
term derives from the Latin word monstrare meaning to show forth
or demonstrate.7 This fact offers an important clue about the
monster concept that the article will explore.
In speaking of monsters a considerable degree of conceptual
precision is required. This is perhaps especially so when attempting
to pinpoint the proper relationship between the linked concepts of
monstrosity and the monstrous. The terms monster, monstrosity and
monstrousness are often used interchangeably and without distinc-
tion in the literature.8 Certainly, the precise relationship between
these terms is rarely delineated. In thinking about the proper
relationship between these terms two texts stand out as aids. These
are Canguilhem’s seminal work on Monstrosity and the Monstrous,9
and the more recent reflections on the subject by Foucault in his text
Abnormal.10 In Canguilhem’s view, monstrosity and the monstrous
“are a duality of concepts with the same etymological root” and are
“at the service of two forms of normative judgment, the medical and
the legal.”11 For Canguilhem, the monster can be understood con-
ceptually as an amalgam of these two forms of normative judgment.
That is, the monster is a creature that is both a monstrosity,
understood in terms of morphological irregularity, and monstrous,
understood in terms of transgression of the law.
Accordingly, on this account, Shildrick’s claim that “what is
monstrous about [monsters] is most often the form of their embodi-
ment”, what she calls their “aberrant corporeality,”12 misses the
point. It confuses the duality of concepts Canguilhem identifies. On
Canguilhem’s account what is monstrous about monsters is not
the form of their embodiment for this constitutes only a breach of
nature. Rather, what is monstrous about monsters lies in trans-
gression of the law. Moreover, for Canguilhem, monstrosity cannot
be divorced from monstrousness for the former term always implies
the latter. That is to say, monstrosity is the effect produced by
monstrousness. For Canguilhem, monstrousness is to be found in
the act or acts believed to cause “aberrant corporeality.” For as he
explains, monstrosity is:
the effect of an infraction of the rule of specific sexual segregation and the sign of a
will to pervert the tableau of creatures. Monstrosity was less a consequence of the
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contingency of life than of the licence of living beings. . . . Monstrosity occurred
unexpectedly because of lack of discretion . . . the result of an animal’s carnival.13
It is clear from this passage that Canguilhem viewed the act of
bestiality as the specific transgression of the law that culminated
in morphological irregularity. Crucially, Canguilhem understands
monstrosity as produced by, or as the effect of, this particular kind
of monstrousness. For Canguilhem, monstrousness equates with a
particular act and taboo and responsibility lies with the female
agent of monster production. As for monstrosity, it is merely the
visible sign and evidence of the mother’s transgressive act.14 In this
respect, monstrosity can be understood as the visible manifestation
of monstrousness. That is to say, in monstrosity, monstrousness
shows forth or is demonstrated. As a result of understanding the
concept of monstrosity exclusively in terms of morphological irregu-
larity, and as the effect of monstrousness, Canguilhem is led to the
conclusion that today “life is poor in monsters.”15 For with the
development of science a view of bodily irregularities as having a
monstrous cause could no longer be sustained. In other words,
“[t]he transparence of monstrosity to scientific thought . . . deprives
it of all relationship to the monstrous.”16 Without monstrousness
the monster is denied one of its constitutive elements and therefore
on Canguilhem’s reckoning disappears.
Turning to Foucault, it is clear that he too comprehends the
monster as an amalgam of the concepts of monstrosity and mon-
strousness. Thus in offering an account of the legal distinction
between deformity and monstrosity, a distinction traceable to
Roman law,17 Foucault notes that the monster represents “the
transgression of natural limits” and that “this is actually what is
involved in monstrosity.”18 Yet, “[f]or Medieval thought, and defi-
nitely for seventeenth and eighteenth century thought” he notes
“breach of natural law is not enough to constitute” the monster.19
There must also be “an interdiction of civil and religious or divine
law” for the monster appears “only when confusion comes up
against, overturns, or disturbs civil, canon, or religious law”20 for
“[t]he monster combines the impossible and the forbidden.”21 To
put it differently, “the monster appears and functions precisely at
the point where nature and law are joined” for the monster is “a
juridico-natural complex.”22 While deformity or disability “may
well be something that upsets the natural order” it does not lead
to the designation monster because “it has a place in civil or
canon law. The disabled person may not conform to nature, but
the law in some way provides for him. Monstrosity, however, is
the kind of irregularity that calls law into question and disables
it.”23
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Elsewhere Foucault explains that a creature is only a monster
because “it is a legal labyrinth, a violation of and an obstacle to the
law, both transgression and undecidability at the level of the law.”24
In juxtaposing violation to obstacle and transgression to undecid-
ability, Foucault renders explicit the concept of monstrousness as
a constitutive element of the category monster. In addition to a
breach of nature, the designation monster requires a breach of the
law, and by breach of the law Foucault is referring both to the fact
that a particular body renders important legal questions uncertain,
indeed undecidable (the body as obstacle to the law), and calls into
question the categorical structure of law (the body as violation of
the law). Thus, for example, human/animal creatures, conjoined
twins and hermaphrodites can be viewed as problematising a
variety of legal questions concerning baptism, marriage and inher-
itance, as well as challenging core legal distinctions between man
and animal, male and female, and the idea of the proper legal
subject as a single embodied mind.25
Thus Foucault shares with Canguilhem a view of the monster as
an amalgam of two forms of normative judgment, the medical and
the legal. He does not, however, insist on a particular relation and
certainly not a causal relation between the concepts of monstrosity
and monstrousness. It is true that, like Canguilhem, Foucault
places emphasis on the transgressive act of bestiality in explaining
historical understandings of irregular bodies designated mon-
sters.26 However, this element does not appear to occupy a central
place within Foucault’s theoretical account. Rather, in thinking
about monstrousness in relation to monsters of old, Foucault
places less emphasis on transgressive acts than on the nature of
the challenge bodies pose to legal certitude and taxonomy. Thus for
Foucault the problem of the monster is ultimately not one of
causation or responsibility, but one of effects. Foucault’s monsters
present a problem of classification. Nevertheless, as with Canguil-
hem’s account, monstrosity, understood in this way, can still be
thought of in terms of the visible manifestation of monstrousness.
For challenge to legal taxonomy is rendered visible by the irregular
body.
In thinking about Foucault’s analysis of the monster concept
more generally what appears central to his account is neither
monstrous acts nor irregular bodies, but the fact of a “double
transgression,”27 of law and nature. For Foucault it is simply the
co-presence of these two forms of breach that accounts for the birth
of monsters. It is precisely this point that enables us to think about
the legal category monster as one that informs the figure of the
abnormal individual. For Foucault the figure of the monster now
functions as a “magnifying model . . . for every little deviation” and
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as “the principle of intelligibility of all the forms that circulate as the
small change of abnormality.”28 Today it is only the normal type,
Tarde’s “zero of monstrosity,”29 that is distanced from the monster.
All those who deviate from the norm bear a relationship by degree
to monster status, one that can be endlessly reworked for the
purpose of recreating the coherence of human identity. Thus
the abnormal individual is a contemporary monster. As with the
human monster, his monstrousness is to be understood in terms of
transgression of the law. This might manifest iself through trans-
gressive acts bearing taboo status or through challenge to legal
taxonomy. The figure of the homosexual may serve as an example
here. Thus breach of the law might be found to exist in the act of
sodomy and/or in the homosexual’s implicit challenge to the het-
eronormative gender order.
In relation to monstrosity it is no longer to be understood in
terms of the externality or materiality of the body. Rather, the
monstrosity of the abnormal individual lies in interiority or psyche.
For what is now sought within regimes of normalisation is “the core
of monstrosity hidden behind little abnormalities, deviances and
irregularities,”30 a monstrosity that “does not produce its effects in
nature and the confusion of species, but in behaviour itself.”31 In
other words, Foucault’s genealogy of the abnormal individual
serves to foreground a shift from the body to the soul as the object
of legal concern. Accordingly, in contrast to monstrosity written on
the surface of irregular bodies, the abnormal individual’s mon-
strosity is of an invisible kind. With the arrival of the abnormal
individual we witness the disappearance or rather the internalisa-
tion of monstrosity. In the context of the abnormal individual,
monstrosity can no longer be understood as the visible manifesta-
tion of monstrousness. It is precisely this fact of invisibility, where
monstrousness is not shown forth or demonstrated, that consti-
tutes the abnormal individual as a figure of modernity. Accordingly,
this displacement and re-institutionalisation of the concept of the
monster has served to uncouple it from its own etymology.
As we will see, an English legal history of the category monster
provides support for many of the theoretical claims made by Can-
guilhem and Foucault. Certainly, English legal monsters appear as
the effect of a double breach, of nature and law, or as an amalgam
of two forms of normative judgment, the medical and the legal.
Moreover, and while not crucial for Foucault’s account, an assump-
tion of bestiality as cause of monstrosity appears to underpin and
typify English legal understandings of the monster category. These
theoretical accounts are important to an understanding of the
monster category within English law. However, in other respects
English law poses a challenge to Foucault’s account of monsters.
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The difficulty with Foucault’s account lies not in his conceptual
understanding of the monster. Rather, the difficulty, as this article
will demonstrate, pertains to his history of monsters and corre-
spondingly to his genealogy of the abnormal individual.
Foucault’s History of Monsters
In addition to providing a useful conceptual framework for making
sense of monsters, Foucault offers a history of human monsters. It
should be conceded from the outset that the history he offers is a
French history. It is not my intention to call into question that
history on account of differences that exist between English and
French law. To do so would fail to take into account historical and
cultural differences that exist between England and France, as well
as the different legal traditions that animate each nation.32 Rather,
what is being challenged is the degree to which Foucault’s history
provides an adequate account for the emergence and comprehen-
sion of the abnormal individual. While Foucault’s history of French
law might be accurate in itself, conclusions drawn from it that
inform our understanding of contemporary regimes of normalisa-
tion are open to a critique based on an analysis of English law. For
the figure of the abnormal individual is not confined to France but
is rather a figure of modernity.
According to Foucault’s history each age had its “privileged mon-
ster.”33 In chronological terms his account moves from a preoccu-
pation with bestial man (the mixture of species) in the Middle Ages
to a concern over Siamese or conjoined twins (the mixture of
individuals) in the Renaissance and ultimately to a focus on the
hermaphrodite (the mixture of sexes) in the Classical age.34 Yet, in
relation to English law we will see that this account proves in-
adequate. Whatever may have been the case outside England,
and whatever may have been the view of monsters within popular
culture and non-legal discourses, including medical discourses,
within England, it is clear that an English legal history of monsters
presents a different and more complex picture both in terms of its
scope and chronology. Moreover, the hermaphrodite was never
considered a monster within English law.35
The difficulty with Foucault’s historical account of monsters is
not confined to a concern to accurately represent a legal past.
Rather, Foucault’s project is a genealogical one that seeks to
account for the emergence of a particular contemporary figure,
which he described as the abnormal individual. Thus in his study
of abnormality, Foucault provides a complex genealogy for the
abnormal individual, one highlighting three key ancestors: the
human monster, incorrigible man, and the masturbating child.36
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During the second half of the eighteenth century “the monster, the
incorrigible and the masturbator are characters who begin to
exchange some of their traits and whose profiles begin to be super-
imposed on each other.”37 Thus, and by way of example, Foucault
notes that within this period masturbation comes to be considered
the cause of “physical deformities” as well as one of “the worst
kinds of monstrous behavior,” while correctional institutions focus
increasingly on “sexuality and masturbation as fundamental to the
problem of the incorrigible.”38 Yet, he insists, these characters
“remain absolutely distinct and separate until the end of the eigh-
teenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century.”39
According to Foucault “a technology of abnormal individuals
appears precisely when a regular network of knowledge and power
has been established that brings the three figures together.”40 On
this account the constitution of the abnormal individual is the
effect of the systematisation, codification and linkage of three
bodies of knowledge and power: natural history, pedagogical tech-
niques, and the biology of sexuality.41 A shift in legal concern from
the human monster to the abnormal individual is to be understood
as “a process that develops between 1765 and 1820–1830”42 and is
to be accounted for by a transformation in “politico-judicial pow-
ers”43 exemplified, perhaps, by a transformation in “the economy of
punitive power.”44 For present purposes, what is significant about
Foucault’s genealogy is the manner in which he links the subject of
contemporary regimes of normalisation to a series of antecedent
figures, and in particular to the figure of the human monster. What
needs to be emphasised is his contention that the organising prin-
ciples of the legal category monster not only structure understand-
ings of the human monster but also structure understandings of
each of the marginalised figures that have succeeded him into the
present.
Thus far I have little objection to Foucault’s historical analysis.
On the contrary it has much to commend it. My difficulty with
Foucault’s history lies with his account of the figure of the human
monster, and specifically, his insistence that the emergence of
human monster types followed a particular sequence. As already
noted, Foucault charts a shift in legal concern from bestial man in
the Middle Ages to a concern over Siamese or conjoined twins in the
Renaissance and ultimately to a focus on the hermaphrodite in the
Classical age. My point here is not to restate that such a chronology
is at odds with English legal history. Rather, it is to highlight the
implications of such a disjunction for the endpoint of Foucault’s
history, the abnormal individual. It is contended that Foucault’s
sequencing of monsters presents a linear history in which the
notion of the human monster as absolute difference takes on an
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increasingly relative character. That is to say, his historical account
begins with the problem of human/animal hybridity. This problem
is then exchanged for the conundrum of the human creature
with two heads, and subsequently for the ambiguously sexed body.
This account implies a gradual lessening of the physical and psy-
chological distance between human being and the figure of the
monster. Moreover, such an account enables Foucault to position
the abnormal individual and contemporary regimes of normalisa-
tion within this frame of historical continuity. Conversely, a history
of the English legal category monster suggests a more complex
relation between human and monster. Indeed, it would appear that
the trend, implicit in Foucault’s account, of a lessening of physical
and psychological distance between human and monster, moves in
the opposite direction within English law.
An English Legal History of Monsters
The legal category monster entered English law in the mid-
thirteenth century in the common law writings of Bracton and
Britton. In On the Laws and Customs of England, Bracton, in
defining legal personhood, states that “those procreated perversely,
against the way of human kind, as where a woman brings forth a
monster or a prodigy” shall “not [be] reckoned among children.”45
However, and in providing some sense of the parameters of thir-
teenth century legal monsters, Bracton notes that “an offspring
who has a larger number of members, as one who has six fingers,
or if he has but four [or only one], will be included among chil-
dren.”46 Nor will a child be considered a monster because it is
“crooked or humpbacked or has twisted limbs or otherwise has its
members useless.”47 However, in a passage not directed toward
addressing the question of monster status, Bracton expressed the
view that the church does not have “several heads like a monster”48
thereby suggesting that he considered conjoined twins to be
monsters.
In short, Bracton’s classificatory scheme distinguished between
monstrosity (and therefore bodies located outside the law) and
deformity (where bodies were located within the law). In doing so
Bracton appears to have followed Roman law.49 The later thirteenth
century writings of Britton replicate Bracton’s taxonomy. Thus
children born with a lesser or greater number of fingers than is
usual are not reckoned monsters. In throwing further light on
where the line is perhaps to be drawn, Britton states that children
born with “three hands or feet . . . shall not be admissible to any
inheritance, or [be] accounted children.”50 Thus, and consistent
with the analyses of Canguilhem and Foucault, the production of
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monsters in thirteenth century English law was tied to anxieties
concerning imagined breaches of nature and law. That is to say, the
elements of the monsters that appear in this period are an irregular
morphology and the assumed practice of bestiality.51 Moreover, it is
precisely these elements that continue to structure the production
of English legal monsters thereafter.
After entering English law in the thirteenth century in the writ-
ings of Bracton and Britton the term monster did not reappear until
the late-sixteenth century.52 In 1590 in a canon law text titled A
Brief Treatise of Testaments and Last Wills the term is re-presented
by Henry Swinburne, lawyer and part-time judge of the Consistory
Court at York. According to Swinburne:
where a wife do bring forth a monster, or misshapen creature, having peradventure
a head like unto a dogs head, or to the head of an ass, or of a raven, or duck, or of
some other beast, or bird: such monstrous creature, though it should live (as
commonly none do) yet it is not accounted amongst the testators children, for the
law doth not presume that creature to have the soul of a man, which hath a form
and shape so strange and different from the shape of a man.53
He continues:
[b]ut if the creature brought forth, do not vary in shape from a man or woman, but
have somewhat more than God by the ordinary course of nature alloweth, as having
six fingers on either hand, or one foot: such creature is not excluded, but is to be
accounted for the testator’s child.54
The figure of the monster next appears in English law in the
writings of John Cowell and the distinguished common law jurist,
Sir Edward Coke. In the first part of his Institutes of the Laws of
England, written in the early seventeenth century, Coke states: “[a]
monster, which hath not the shape of mankind, cannot be heire or
inherit any land, albeit it be brought forth within marriage . . . but
although he hath deformity in any part of his body, yet if he hath
human shape he may be heire.”55
While this passage offers little assistance as to where the line
between deformity and monstrosity is to be drawn, John Cowell,
writing in 1605, articulates more clearly a Bractonian understand-
ing of the distinction. That is, while “those who are brought forth
contrary to the form of mankind . . . as monsters and prodigies in
nature” are neither legitimate or reputed children, “those which are
irregular only in members, as having six fingers, or four, or only
one, shall not for that be esteemed illegitimate.”56 The next English
legal text referring to the legal category monster, and the last
unique rendition of the category, is to be found in the mid-
eighteenth century common law writings of William Blackstone.57
In relation to monsters Blackstone declared:
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[a] monster, which hath not the shape of mankind, but in any part evidently bears
the resemblance of the brute creation, hath no inheritable blood, and cannot be heir
to any land, albeit it be brought forth in marriage: but although it hath deformity in
any part of its body, yet if it hath human shape, it may be heir.58
This legal history is interesting in many respects. Of course, the
authorities cited are few in number. Nevertheless, they include the
legal writings of Bracton, Coke and Blackstone, the most important
common law jurists in English legal history. Their works represent
the most important collections of English common law compiled
between the late Middle Ages and the Enlightenment. Lest it be
thought that their representations of monsters were idiosyncratic
and out of step with broader legal understandings of monsters in
particular historical moments, it should be appreciated that each of
their texts represented, in sequential fashion, English law for cen-
turies. From a perspective internal to English law, Bracton, Coke
and Blackstone were the law of England. Had their monster texts
been viewed as legally problematic it is likely that dissensus would
have led to the production of a greater number of legal texts on
monsters.
A deeper appreciation of the legal history presented would require
locating each legal text within its socio-political context. As Cohen
notes, the successful disavowal of monsters at the societal level
requires both “a degree of cultural uniformity and relative social
calm.”59 These features appear to have been absent in moments of
English legal monster production. Thus Bracton’s text emerged
within a period characterised in terms of a “quest for intellec-
tual and institutional uniformity and corporatism throughout
Europe.”60 It was a period that witnessed the emergence of a
nascent English state,61 a drive toward orthodoxy within Christian
theology and practice, and a time when religious crusades, and
their failure, weighed heavily in the West on the collective imagi-
nation.62 Equally, the late sixteenth century writings of Henry
Swinburne need to be situated within the political and theological
context of the English Reformation and Counter-Reformation.
During the period of the Reformation, both in England and in
Europe, literature on monsters proliferated and was deployed by
both sides of the religious struggle and for the purposes of that
struggle.63 The suggestion that Swinburne’s text is to be under-
stood in this way finds support in the animal symbolism of the
creatures he identifies. That is, his dog, ass and raven-headed
creatures lend themselves to a set of contemporaneous meanings
that revolve around religious themes. Thus in both the medieval
and early modern periods the dog was associated with the devil and
the ass with the Jew.64 Equally, the figure of the raven pointed to
(religious) war, death and the afterlife. As noted by Fleming, in
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Western Europe, “ravens appear almost exclusively as signatory
animals for deities,”65 that is, as portents. In relation to the monster
text in Coke’s Institutes it might be understood in the context of
socio-political anxieties preceding the English Civil War. As for
Blackstone, his monster might be understood as an allegory for the
common law, standing as it does in opposition to the dictates of the
Enlightenment. For Blackstone was a social conservative who pre-
ferred law’s mystery to “the devouring gaze of reason.”66 Such a view
is, perhaps, reinforced by the Gothic aesthetic which informs his
Commentaries.67
These suggested linkages may be important to an understanding
of the English legal history of monsters. However, the proper loca-
tion of these legal texts requires further historical inquiry. For the
purposes of this article what is important is not the social forces
that account for the specificity of particular constructions of mon-
sters, but the trajectory of monster production. For the article is
less concerned with the causes of the appearance of monsters than
with their effects. While there is a degree of unevenness in English
law, the trend in the legal construction of monsters is one where
monsters became increasingly fantastic over time. Thus in the late
Middle Ages, when the category first entered English law, monsters
possessed something of a matter-of-fact quality. That is, they seem
to accord with embodied reality, albeit one of corporeal excess.
Thus humans born with three hands or feet68 or two heads69 were
adjudged monsters. This is not to suggest that the human/animal
distinction proved irrelevant to an understanding of monsters for
legal jurists of the thirteenth century. On the contrary, and con-
sistent with the analyses of Canguilhem and Foucault, it seems
reasonably clear that Bracton and Britton attributed the existence
of monsters to the practice of bestiality.70 Nevertheless, the legal
monsters produced in thirteenth century England lacked any spe-
cifically animal features. That is to say, for Bracton and Britton, a
concern with animality was confined to aetiology. Animality was
simply not written on the bodies of their monsters. In this regard,
English legal history does not support Foucault’s claim that it was
bestial man who was the “privileged monster”71 of this period.
By the time of the Renaissance the monster category had
expanded to include human/animal hybridity. Thus in the writings
of Henry Swinburne the legal monster of corporeal excess is supple-
mented by dog, raven and duck-headed human creatures.72 For
Swinburne, monsters are not confined to creatures considered to
be the product of inter-species copulation. Rather, monsters extend
to creatures that bear the authorial mark or imprint of two different
species. Moreover, Swinburne not only introduces human/animal
hybridity to the monster category of English law. He also fore-
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grounds the visibility of human/animal hybridity as emblematic of
monstrosity. This is especially apparent in his location of the
human/animal monster at the apex of a monster hierarchy. Thus,
in contrast to his view that excessive or disordered bodies are not
necessarily monsters, he harboured no doubt as to the monster
status of human/animal hybrids. For it was only the legal status of
the former that Swinburne viewed as involving a question of judi-
cial discretion.73 In contrast, in the writings of Coke and Cowell
something of a reversion to a Bractonian understanding of mon-
sters is apparent. However, while these seventeenth century jurists
do not articulate a monster whose corporeal surface expresses
human/animal hybridity, is is apparent that bestiality is viewed as
the cause of monstrosity. Moreover, this is rendered more explicit
by Coke than by thirteenth century legal jurists. Thus in his
treatment of the crime of buggery, Coke notes that prior to a 1533
statute criminalising the act, “a great Lady had committed buggery
with a Baboon, and conceived by it.”74 Nevertheless, while his
reference to bestiality implies that the human/animal distinction is
important to his understanding of what causes monstrosity, Coke’s
concern does not appear to move beyond the aetiological and, like
Swinburne’s, encompass the horrifying visible embodiment or
spectacle of human/animal hybridity.
By the time of the eighteenth century we might have expected
law’s human monsters to fade from view. After all, from the late
sixteenth century scientific discourse had gradually been removing
the epistemological ground from beneath the feet of monsters. That
is, from the writings of Ambroise Pare in 157375 monsters were
increasingly naturalised within medical science. Indeed, and as
observed by Daston, in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries understandings of monsters “swung from the almost-
supernatural extreme of portents to the almost-natural extreme of
Baconian facts.”76 Yet, by the time of the Enlightenment, rather
than the disappearance of monsters, we witness, in the Commen-
taries of William Blackstone, the reduction of monsters precisely to
human/animal hybridity. In this regard, the Blackstonian monster
is less than an act of fidelity to his noted sources, namely Bracton
and Coke.77 Not only does it seem clear that Blackstone held
the view that “a monster is the product of animal paternity,”78 he
also understood the monster exclusively in terms of the visibility
of human/animal hybridity. Moreover, unlike Swinburne, Black-
stone’s concern over human/animal hybridity was not confined to
the head. Rather, it included a human creature that “in any part”79
bore resemblance to animality. In other words, unlike Swinburne’s,
Blackstone’s anxiety over human/animal hybridity cannot be
reduced to a concern over the status and metaphorical power of the
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head in understanding human status. This, in itself, is of interest
given the status that reason commanded in the Enlightenment
period. Rather, for Blackstone, any degree of animality proved
sufficient to label a human creature a legal monster. In this regard,
Blackstone’s text, rather than signaling a departure from a less
rational legal past, appears as the most hysterical and fantastical
moment in English legal monster production.
While Blackstone’s text represents the last unique rendition of
the legal category monster, it was not the final enunciation of the
category within English law. Blackstone’s Commentaries, and his
particular human/animal hybrid construction of the monster,
appear to have survived as authoritative texts until at least the
mid-nineteenth century. After his death over twenty editions of his
Commentaries were published in England,80 each of which repli-
cates his monster category. Lest it be thought that these texts, at
the time of their publication, were nothing more than historical
documents, it should be appreciated that Blackstone’s Com-
mentaries exerted an important influence on the subsequent de-
velopment of English law. Moreover, subsequent editions of his
Commentaries were not merely faithful reproductions; they note
departures occasioned by changes in the law.81 Accordingly, Black-
stone’s figure of the human/animal hybrid continued to resonate
as the exclusive locus of the monster within the English legal
imaginary well into the nineteenth century.
The finding that the legal construction of monsters became
increasingly fantastic over time and that law became increasingly
concerned with human/animal hybridity with the coming of
modernity serves to raise some important questions. One such
question concerns determining how much weight and influence
should be given to the legal category monster and, in particular, to
the figure of the human/animal hybrid in understanding the con-
temporary figure of the abnormal individual. A history of the legal
category monster provides evidence to suggest increasing legal
anxiety concerning the boundary between human and animal. Of
course, growing anxiety of this kind has been well documented in
broader cultural terms from at least the early modern period82
when scientists and intellectuals began “to break down the rigid
boundaries between animals and man which earlier theorists had
tried to raise.”83 The contention here is that an intensification of
anxiety over the boundaries between human and animal is not only
internal to law, but resides precisely within a category of the law
that, according to Foucault, operates as the model for understand-
ing all forms of contemporary abnormality.
This claim does not serve to undermine the theoretical strength
of Foucault’s work. On the contrary, the insights offered by a study
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of English law give additional weight to Foucault’s conceptual
framework generally and, more specifically, to its application to the
figure of the abnormal individual. That is, a history of the legal
category monster provides added impetus to Foucault’s claim that
the abnormal individual is an effect of a double breach, of law and
nature. However, this legal history also provides a vantage point
from which to reassess the importance of breach of nature to an
understanding of the constitution of the abnormal individual. For
an English law pre-history of the abnormal individual moves
toward rather than away from human/animal hybridity, and there-
fore toward a more profound breach of the laws of nature. This
requires us to consider the possibility that the trope of the unnatu-
ral might be more important to an understanding of the construc-
tion of the abnormal individual than Foucault’s analysis suggests.
It is precisely a reconsideration of the relationship between the
(ab)normal and the (un)natural in constituting this contemporary
figure that an English legal history of monsters invites. While
further historical inquiry is required here, we might expect this
history, and growing anxiety over the human/animal distinction
which it suggests, to have insinuated itself into the figure of the
abnormal individual to a greater degree, and possibly with different
cultural consequences, than Foucault’s analysis implies. If so, this
would serve to emphasise greater continuity between the abnormal
individual and his most recent English law ancestor. This claim
perhaps derives support from the fact that English legal monsters
survived into the mid-nineteenth century. That is to say, the
human/animal hybrid should not be thought of simply as part of
the abnormal individual’s pre-history. For when viewed from the
perspective of English law it is clear that the human/animal hybrid
and the abnormal individual co-exist and overlap.
Conclusion
This article has considered Foucault’s history of the monster in
relation to a history of this category offered by English law. While
Foucault’s conceptual framework for making sense of monsters
finds support in English legal texts, these texts simultaneously
pose a challenge for his historical account of monsters. Thus bestial
man, the figure Foucault places at the heart of the western psyche
in the Middle Ages, appears noticeably absent in thirteenth century
legal texts.84 Rather, these texts appear confined to human bodies
characterised by corporeal excess. Moreover, and in contrast to
Foucault’s account, the importance of the human/animal hybrid
within English law increases over time culminating in Blackstone’s
reduction of law’s monsters to precisely this figure. Accordingly,
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England’s legal monsters take on an increasingly fantastical quality
over time as they move toward their eventual death. In this respect
Blackstone’s text seems particularly significant in that it represents
not merely a departure from, but a rupture in, a Foucauldian
history in which the notion of the monster as absolute difference
takes on an increasingly relative character.
It is this finding that is perhaps especially significant. For English
legal history does not suggest a gradual relativisation of the differ-
ence between human and monster. While Foucault is correct to
emphasis genealogical links between the human monster and the
abnormal individual, his emphasis on a gradual shift away from the
notion of the monster as absolute difference in this process of
transformation is problematised by an analysis that looks to
English law. For English law appears to have privileged human/
animal hybridity in its construction of monsters over time, and
therefore to have placed emphasis on a breach of nature of the most
profound kind. The insight offered by this legal history is one that
points to the possibility that the trope of the unnatural might be
more important to an understanding of the construction of the
abnormal individual than Foucault’s analysis suggests. In other
words, a history of the English legal category monster points to the
need to consider the precise relationship between constructions of
nature and their breach, and the production of abnormal individ-
uals. Moreover, from the position of English law it might be sus-
pected that the trope of the unnatural operates as a tension within
normalising regimes. Indeed, constructions of nature and their
deployment might be understood as a limit to this very project of
modernity.
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